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Reflections on  the Pragmatics of  the 
Illustrated Perspective Treatise
Performative Failures and (Pre-) Romantic Innovations
EDuarDo ralic k as
T his essay focuses on an issue that has remained unaddressed in the  critical fortune of the illustrated perspective treatise,1 namely, the pragmatic con-
ditions whereby perspective is “demonstrated.”2 By drawing on a set of–now 
 common3–critical tools developed in the fields of linguistics and the  philosophy 
1. For an overview of recent research on the perspective treatise, see Lyle Massey 
(ed.), The Treatise on Perspective: Published and Unpublished, Washington, New Haven 
and London, National Gallery of Art and Yale University Press, 2003. For a comprehen-
sive survey of such treatises, see Kirsti Andersen, The Geometry of an Art: The History 
of the Mathematical Theory of Perspective from Alberti to Monge, New York, Springer, 
2007.
2. The question pertaining to the “demonstration” of perspective has been addressed 
by Hubert Damisch in his influential study L’origine de la perspective [1987], Paris, 
 Flammarion, coll. “Champs”, 1993, p. 81-187. My analysis differs from Damisch’s though, 
insofar as I attend to a recurrent problem that arises in the context of printed perspective 
treatises from the 16th century onwards, whereas Damisch mostly focuses on Brunelleschi’s 
prototype, the so-called tavoletta, which was presumably the first instrument designed for 
the teaching and dissemination of linear perspective.
3. My methodological framework draws on the theory of performative speech acts 
developed by John Langshaw Austin. See John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things 
with Words [1962], Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972. This methodological 
positioning has its own set of historical implications, for my approach also draws on the 
thought of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Recent research on Fichte convincingly demonstrates 
that his philosophy contains the first modern account of performativity. My analysis of 
the performative shortcomings of the perspective treatise can thus be read as an attempt 
to provide a material basis for Fichte’s claims in the 1794-1795 Grundlage der gesamten 
Wissenschaftslehre, that the classical age’s system of representation is inconsistent when 
regarded from the point of view of its pragmatic uses. The present paper thus sets the stage 
for reappraisal of the pre-history of the German romantic paradigm itself. For an analysis 
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of language, I consider a corpus of illustrated books published between the 
 early 16th and the mid-17th centuries, whose purpose was to teach its “users” (who 
were more than just “readers”) to construct homogeneous perspectival spaces. 
As will be made clear in what follows, the demonstration of perspective relies 
on  ambiguous devices that lie between the book page and the autonomous 
“ tableau,” between the “ideal” and abstract space of mathematical geometry and 
the concrete materiality of images. The users of such books are required to ne-
gotiate their passage through this porous boundary by literally performing with 
and according to the perspective treatise’s discursive parameters. By remaining 
sensitive to the ambiguities such performances entail, this paper sheds new light 
on the pragmatic structure of the illustrated perspective treatise.
Based on a fundamental distinction made in the field of pragmatics, I 
contend that much like speech acts (whose propositional content may or may 
not enter into conflict with a given speech act’s illocutionary force) the images 
designed to demonstrate the perspectival system are plagued by an opposi-
tion between the conceptual “content” of perspective and the figurative means 
deployed to convey such content. In all cases, this aporia between concept and 
display, which defines the teaching of perspective by means of images, arises 
when the figurative discourse of perspective attempts to integrate a representation 
of its actual user within the system’s framework. In the final analysis, figuring the 
user of perspective is one of perspective’s chief impossibilities. Furthermore, given 
the epistemological context in which such treatises were written, this  pragmatic 
problem ought to be regarded as a performative contradiction that is constitutive 
of the perspectival system’s mode of visual rationality. In closing, I suggest that 
the performative incongruities endemic to the perspective treatise allow one to 
reconsider some of the pictorial innovations of German romanticism, particularly 
those of Caspar David Friedrich, a painter whose work is tied in fundamental 
(and hitherto unforeseen) ways to the “failures” of the classical age.
When one casts a backward glance at the early modern history of the printed 
scientific treatise, the illustrated perspective treatise, which was invented in the first 
years of the 16th century, emerges as an innovative genre in which word and image 
are set against one another in a fundamentally new way. Whereas in early printed 
of Fichte’s theory of performativity, see Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel, Critique de la représen-
tation. Étude sur Fichte, Paris, Vrin, 1999.
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editions of Euclid’s Optics,4 for instance, both text and image share the burden of 
scientific proof, the first illustrated perspective treatise, Jean Pélerin’s De artificiali 
perspectiva5 foregrounded its illustrations as the sole conveyors of the conceptual 
information it sought to disseminate, while textual explanation was relegated to the 
ancillary role of providing contextual or preliminary data. The fact remains: in De 
artificiali perspectiva and in most subsequent treatises, however sophisticated they 
were to become, text plays an introductory role that does not ground the demons-
tration of perspective as a rational system epistemi cally. Once the meaning of the 
various lines and functions that make up a given perspective diagram have been 
comprehended by the reader, the image itself functions as the ultimate instan-
tiation of what perspective is. Here, images are both the means and the ends, the 
method, evidence, proof, and performance of the nature of perspective.
It can safely be argued that such a shift towards an imagistic form of ratio-
nality placed greater emphasis on the reader’s cognitive abilities, if only because 
the “reader” was suddenly required to decipher complex visual information that 
simultaneously demonstrated how perspective is constructed while  enacting 
that very construction in the first place. Although perspective treatises were 
not  scientific tracts in any strong sense of the term (for they were produced for 
 varying forms of readership spanning humanistic circles and the workshops of 
artists and artisans), one general characteristic underpins the genre as such, 
namely, the pragmatic structure of these publications. Such books invariably 
make use of what Damisch has termed a “scientific protocol” whereby the 
de monstration and, correlatively, the transmission of objective knowledge to a 
second party tacitly involves the claim that such a party re-enact and substan-
tiate all the steps that comprise a given demonstration’s experimental basis. In 
other words, the objective validity that the illustrations contained in perspective 
treatises claim to instantiate are grounded, in the final analysis, on “first-person” 
reconstructive acts performed by the users of such pictures.6 In keeping with 
4. See, for example, the influential Italian edition of the Optics that was translated and 
edited by Egnazio Danti, La prospettiva di Euclide, Florence, nella Stamperia de’Giunti, 
1573. This edition is noteworthy if only because it is one of the principal sources of many 
subsequent perspective treatises–including those analyzed here–that reproduced Euclid’s 
theorems and illustrations.
5. Viator, De artificiali perspectiva, Toul, Petri Jacobi, 1505. Viator is a Latin form of 
Pélerin’s name.
6. I am using the term “first person” to denote performative acts undertaken by self-
conscious, autonomous agents. I intend it as a marker of rationality, rather than merely as 
a sign of what is irreducibly individual.
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Damisch’s account of Brunelleschi’s lost tavoletta, this protocol of autonomous 
counter-verification partakes in the very “origin”7 of perspective itself–an origin 
that is rehearsed anew every time the pedagogical relation between image and 
user is played out.
It follows, moreover, that the users of such images stand on the same ground 
as the “artists” who produced them, insofar as these illustrations make epistemo-
logical claims. The illustrations contained in perspective treatises are exemplars 
of a unique cross-fertilization process that is located precisely at the crossroads of 
the modern histories of science and art. Part and parcel of the rise of this artistic-
scientific regime is the disenfranchisement of the autonomy of the artist and the 
invention of a new, inter-subjectively bound form of spectatorship that is simul-
taneously a mode of spectatorial production. What is produced and re-produced 
by artist and beholder, respectively and reciprocally, is the shared epistemological 
space of perspective.
Given this general framework, it is worth reconsidering a series of emble-
matic images drawn from the golden age of the perspective treatise–that is, 
the late 16th to mid-17th centuries–in order to understand the pragmatic basis 
upon which perspective is taught. Chief among these is a diagram that was first 
 published in Jacopo Barozzi da Vignola’s posthumous Le due regole della pros-
pettiva pratica8 as an illustration of the author’s prima regola (fig. 1). A careful 
 reading of this image ought to acknowledge that its components have hetero-
geneous  semiotic values that span symbolic and iconic forms of representation 
(the lines of sight and the female figure from which they originate, respectively), 
as well as “ideal,” mathematical ones (the geometrical relations denoted by such 
perpendicular lines as GB and AB; the series of squares lying below line CD, 
etc).9 However, in many instances a given segment may conflate two or more 
kinds of representation, as is the case with line AB, which is both a symbolic 
representation of the picture plane as seen by the female figure CG as well as a 
7. Damisch, 1993, p. 89 et sq.
8. This treatise was edited and published by mathematician Egnazio Danti:  Jacopo 
Barozzi da Vignola, Le due regole della prospettiva pratica di M. Iacomo Barozzi da 
Vignola con i comentarij del R.P.M. Egnatio Danti dell’ordine de predicatori matema-
tico dello studio di Bologna (Roma, per Francesco Zannetti, 1583). For an account of the 
 history of this treatise, see Francesca Fiorani, “Danti Edits Vignola: The Formation of a 
Modern Classic on Perspective,” in Massey, 2003, p. 127-159. Also see Timothy K. Kitao, 
“Prejudice in Perspective: A Study of Vignola’s Perspective Treatise,” The Art Bulletin, 
vol. 44, n° 3, September 1962, p. 173-199.
9. I am using the term “ideal” to denote the ideality of geometric space. 
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Fig. 1 : Jacopo Barozzi da Vignola and Egnatio Danti, Le due regole della prospettiva pratica di M. Iacomo 
Barozzi da Vignola con i comentarij del R.P.M. Egnatio Danti dell ordine de predicatori matematico dello 
studio di Bologna, Rome, Francesco Zannetti, 1583, p. 69. Collection Centre Canadien d’Architecture/
Canadian Centre for Architecture, Montréal. Photograph by Eduardo Ralickas.
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geometrical entity whose mathematical properties are strictly consistent with the 
laws of two-dimensional, Euclidian geometry.
The demonstration of Vignola’s “first rule” begins by formulating a set of 
clear, textual definitions. The line that links points A and C is defined as the 
 distance between the viewer’s position in space and the picture plane AB (lite-
rally la parete: the wall). GB is both the horizon line as well as the distance 
between the female figure’s eye to the picture plane. Thus, the plate depicts 
a female figure seen in profile who stands in front of a picture plane, which is 
also seen in profile.10 Importantly, all elements lying below the ground line AD 
belong to a ground-plan rendering of the volumes that are to be projected into 
perspectival space (in the central portion of the illustration). In keeping with 
Euclid’s tenth proposition expounded in the Optics11 contemporary readers were 
asked to understand that AR, RP, and PQ are perceived by the female figure as 
lengths AL, LK, and KH. Moreover, the success of this rich illustration is partly 
due to the way it synthesizes concepts with the illusion of space, for the actual 
viewer of Le due regole also perceives the former lengths as equal quantities quali-
tatively receding in space in the middle of the image. As Lyle Massey has aptly 
noted, what is surprising about Vignola’s demonstration to readers fami liar with 
Leon Battista Alberti’s so-called costruzione legittima is that the centric point is 
10. Vignola’s readers would have been familiar with the function of this human  figure: 
it is an iconic representation of the user of perspective and, hence, of the reader of Le due 
regole. In fact, an illustration that appears earlier on in the book (on page 55) shows a male 
figure in profile standing in front of a transparent wall or picture plane through which 
pass the visual rays linking the man’s eye and the vertices of a uniform octagonal prism 
that lies on the ground, to the right. Interestingly, this octagonal prism can be regarded 
as an abstract schema of the octagonal baptistery in Florence; the square-shaped wall 
and the image projected upon it thus recall Brunelleschi’s mythical  tavoletta as recon-
stituted in the writings of the latter’s early biographers, Manetti and Vasari.  Vignola’s and 
Danti’s commentary seems to support this view, for Vignola claims that the image in ques-
tion shows “il nascimento di questa regola” and Danti posits that it shows “l’origine, anzi 
l’essentia della Prospettiva” (Vignola, 1583, p. 55-56).
11. Danti, Vignola’s posthumous editor, had previously translated the Optics. For 
a reproduction and analysis of this proposition, see Samuel Y. Edgerton Jr., “Alberti’s 
Perspective: A New Discovery and a New Evaluation,” The Art Bulletin, vol. 48, n° 3, 
September-December 1966, p. 373 et sq. For an analysis of the relation between optics 
and perspective, see C.D. Brownson, “Euclid’s Optics and its Compatibility with Linear 
Perspective,” Archive for History of Exact Sciences, vol. 24, n° 3, September 1981, p. 165-194.
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not the starting point of the operation, but rather its ultimate conclusion.12 In this 
way, Vignola’s text (as well as Danti’s lengthier commentary) go on to explain that 
the transverse lines that generate the full illusion of perspective are determined 
according to a set of measurements taken on the floor plan. Thus, segments SA, 
OL, NK, and MH are obtained by measuring the distance between segments 
AE, ADD, AEE, and AFF.
Given that Vignola’s first move was to define both the figure on the left and 
the vertical line AB as the viewer who stands in for the image’s actual spectator 
and as the picture plane seen in profile, respectively, it follows that this highly 
synthetic diagram is in fact a representation of one’s present act of looking. Thus, 
Vignola’s discourse on perspective disavows any external or meta-discursive posi-
tion, for the grammar by means of which perspective is explained here is itself 
constituted by the rules of perspective. One could term this state of affairs the 
“systemic closure” of perspectival demonstrations.
Moreover, the viewer of Vignola’s demonstration is given to see the exact 
same perspectival image that the female figure has putatively been seeing all 
along upon the surface of the parete that she faces (a surface that is invisible 
from the reader’s point of view, for whom this entity functions as a fully present 
geometric line and not as an iconic “representation” of an object, be it a wall 
or a painting).13 In light of this reciprocal yet temporally displaced ordering of 
gazes, Vignola’s plate illustrates that the demonstration of perspective is a matter 
of signifying one gaze by means of another. Here, seeing “correctly” (read: in 
accor dance with the epistemological framework to which this image lays claim) 
implies that one must submit to the vision of the other–to the woman represented 
on the left. One could term this function of perspectival demonstrations the 
“delegation of looking.” Furthermore, Vignola’s diagram implicitly summons the 
viewer to make use of two distinct cognitive abilities, namely, that of perceiving 
space and that of conceiving mathematical relations. Massey, who has studied this 
12. See Lyle Massey, “Configuring Spatial Ambiguity: Picturing the Distance Point 
from Alberti to Anamorphosis,” in Massey, 2003, p. 164-166. Also see Lyle Massey,  Picturing 
Space, Displacing Bodies: Anamorphosis in Early Modern Theories of Perspective, Univer-
sity Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007, p. 51 et sq.
13. This difference hinges on the semiotics of the line: as opposed to the representa-
tion of a referent (such as a wall) which, by definition, is absent, a geometric line fully 
instantiates itself as it collapses the gap between sign and referent. As a result, the viewer 
who focuses on segment AH must make a choice between perceiving this entity as the 
instantiation of a geometrically valid figure or as an image (i.e., as a line that recedes into 
perspectival space).
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image at length, makes this point is a very convincing and succinct way: “The 
demonstration is quite extraordinary in the precise way that it shows how the 
perpendicular line marking the plane of intersection, BA, represents both what 
we see and how we see it.”14 Put otherwise, from a series of conceptual, mathe-
matical operations, which the viewer understands, Vignola’s image ultimately 
depicts a space that one experiences. Massey writes in this respect: 
[Vignola] presents us with a fallacy, pointing out that while we can see that the 
 perspective is measured and rational, nevertheless we cannot actually see ourselves 
seeing this. We must make a choice between apprehending the geometric rela-
tionships illustrated in the diagram and embodying the external viewpoint that the 
diagram constructs.15
Massey’s unusual approach to Vignola, which is sensitive to the way  viewers 
experience space in an embodied way, opens up a new avenue of enquiry for 
approaching all images designed to teach readers/viewers how to construct 
 perspectival spaces. However, her insight concerning the disjunction between 
conceiving and perceiving can be taken out of the domain of “embodied expe-
rience” and recast in terms of a “visual epistemology” (for lack of a better term). 
As such, it allows one to pinpoint a pragmatic flaw that becomes “visible” provi-
ded one is attentive to the actual use value of the illustrations at hand (as opposed 
to the conceptual content they presumably picture). In what follows, I sidestep 
what could be called the “descriptive fallacy” of perspectival demonstrations in 
order to target their performative modalities.16 More specifically, I suggest that 
these illustrations foster a performative contradiction, i.e., a contradiction between 
what the illustrated demonstrations claim to do and the actual means afforded 
their users for doing it. I demonstrate that the very validity underpinning the 
allegedly rational demonstration of perspective is unstable, if only because to use 
the images that drive such demonstrations is to transgress the rules of  perspectival 
space; as a result, the system violates its own validity in the very process of its 
demonstration. In the language of pragmatics this inconsistency–arising out 
of the use value of a given epistemological system–is termed a performative 
 contradiction. In the case of the illustrated perspective treatise, performative 
contra dictions arise time and again as the system attempts to picture its real users 
as they are engaged in the act of using the system.
14. Massey, 2003, p. 165.
15. Massey, 2007, p. 53.
16. See Austin, 1972, p. 3 et sq.
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The following image (fig. 2) is a case in point. It was originally published 
in what is no doubt one of the classical age’s most “rigorous” French perspective 
treatises: Abraham Bosse’s Manière universelle de Mr Desargues pour  pratiquer la 
perspective (Paris: Des-Hayes, 1648). For the sake of my argument, it suffices to 
 understand the general purpose of Bosse’s illustration. Putting aside such tech-
nical innovations whereby Bosse (and his mentor, Girard Desargues)17 success-
fully construct perspectival spaces in an immanent fashion,18 I would like to 
focus on the place of the viewer and his or her relation to the perspectival space 
that he or she projects.
17. The intellectual relationship between Bosse and Desargues is a well documented 
affair. For a contextual analysis, see Marianne Le Blanc, D’acide et d’encre. Abraham Bosse 
(1604-1676) et son siècle en perspectives, Paris, CNRS éditions, 2004. Also see Maxime 
Préaud, Sophie Join-Lambert, et Idelette Ardouin-Weiss (eds.), Abraham Bosse. Savant 
Graveur, Tours, vers 1604-1676, Paris, Paris et Tours, Bibliothèque nationale de France et 
Musée des beaux-arts de Tours, 2003.
18. Bosse’s system does not presuppose the construction of a ground plan that 
 transcends the perspectival frame as such.
Fig. 2 : Abraham Bosse, Manière universelle de Mr Desargues, pour pratiquer la perspective par petit-pied, 
comme le geometral, Paris, Pierre Des-Hayes, 1648 (plate 4). Collection Centre Canadien d’Architecture/
Canadian Centre for Architecture, Montréal. Photograph by Eduardo Ralickas.
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Much like in Vignola’s previous illustration, the user of the perspectival 
system is assigned a precise location within the image. The page-long  caption 
that accompanies this illustration explains how one ought to interpret the 
 various lines depicted. Accordingly, they stem from heterogeneous semiotic 
regimes. The protagonist stands on a plane that is marked by a coordinate 
system. He holds a set of strings in his right hand, vis-à-vis his eye; these strings, 
which re present the so-called pyramid of vision, are linked to the vertices of 
a square that appears on the ground plane. Thus, this image functions as a 
 meta-discursive representation of the apparatus of perspective itself and it is 
consistent with other such repre sentations.
However, on closer inspection one fact will no doubt perturb any interpre-
tation that seeks the comfort of coherence: how ought one to comprehend the 
position of the small man’s body with respect to the–highly ambiguous–space in 
which he stands? Bosse’s text makes no mention of this problem. In fact, the man’s 
body functions much like a liminal object as it belongs simultaneously to two 
spatial worlds without, however, subscribing to either. Although the man’s body 
Fig. 3 : Abraham Bosse, Manière universelle de Mr Desargues, pour pratiquer la perspective par petit-pied, 
comme le geometral, Paris, Pierre Des-Hayes, 1648 (plate 2). Collection Centre Canadien d’Architecture/
Canadian Centre for Architecture, Montréal. Photograph by Eduardo Ralickas.
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is represented as a three-dimensional object seen from above (above where?), 
he stands on a “floor” whose purpose and structure are of a purely  geometric 
nature. Indeed, this “floor” is really a plane; as such, it is not only wholly two-
dimensional but also “immaterial.” Thus, it simply makes no sense to conceive 
its mode of spatialization in three-dimensional terms, or to regard it as the stage 
for objecthood. Nevertheless, the sheer placement of the protagonist’s body on/
within this grid is to impute three-dimensionality to it–an inconsistent gesture 
from a mathematical point of view.
Moreover, when compared to a plate that appears just a few pages earlier 
(fig. 3), one immediately realizes to what extent Bosse’s demonstration is com-
prised of a patchwork of incongruous notions of space. In the earlier image 
(which is sometimes called Les perspecteurs), several men conduct experiments 
in perspective by holding a set of strings that are attached to figures drawn on an 
actual ground. Importantly, these men, the space that surrounds them, as well as 
the figures they study are depicted within a single, pervasive perspectival space. 
This “scenographic” principle whereby pedagogical narration is framed by one 
homogeneous spatial code finds no purchase in fig. 2. In fact, trying to determine 
the exact position of the small man’s body in the latter image is an exercise in 
futility: if one considers that his body is a three-dimensional object, with respect 
to the geometric ground (which now must function as a “floor” and requires the 
viewer to shift semiotic regimes with respect to this portion of the image) the 
man is neither upright nor slanted, but both at the same time (depending on the 
frame of reference one chooses). Furthermore, the “link” between the hetero-
geneous spatial regimes of geometry and perspective–i.e., the visual pyramid 
whose apex lies at the man’s eye–is an early example of axonometric projection19 
(provided one singles out this object as an autonomous entity).
Pedagogical reasons may have motivated a mathematically minded artist 
such as Bosse to construct this layered and incongruous image. For the sake 
of pedagogy Bosse no doubt attempted to accommodate both an illusionistic, 
three-dimensional space and a “flat,” geometric space on the same page. One 
ought to bear in mind here that perspective is an operation that transforms 
and projects two-dimensional, geometric shapes–which are shapes seen from 
19. In axonometric perspective parallel lines do not converge at a point on the 
 horizon line; rather, they remain parallel, as is the case with the two sets of parallel 
segments that comprise the square in question. For an overview of the pre-20th-century 
history of axonometry, see Yve-Alain Bois, “Metamorphosis of Axonometry,” Daidalos 1, 
 September 15, 1981, p. 41-58. 
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nowhere, which is to say, from everywhere–into situated shapes, i.e., shapes seen 
from somewhere. Thus, in perspective a square looks trapezoidal and a circle 
appears elliptical. Bosse perhaps sought to draw shapes that do not look like 
other shapes but that are self-evident presentations of themselves. In fact, it can 
be said that Bosse’s illustration strives for the utmost clarity: in this plate three-
dimensional space (which is the space the actual viewer is believed to inhabit) 
subsists alongside the space of geometry (which is the space of “reason” and, by 
extension, of “explanation”).
Nevertheless, Bosse’s illustration transgresses the laws of one-point, linear 
perspective, if only better to illustrate the overall parameters by means of which 
such laws operate. The resulting contradiction bears on the image’s claim to 
rational validity, since the demonstration of how perspective’s putative users 
relate to the geometrical properties of perspectival space produces a curious 
 situation in which portions of that space are represented in such a way as to 
violate the  coherence of perspective itself. In the case of Bosse’s meta- discursive 
image it is impossible to determine the point of view from which the image 
was made. Who is “speaking” and from “where” does this invisible  subject of 
 enunciation  profess the present discourse on perspective? Such questions 
remain unaddressed. Nevertheless, these ambiguities are symptomatic of the 
failure that is constitutive of the demonstration of perspective as such, namely, 
the failure of fully encompassing the user of perspective as he or she fulfils the 
functional role the image assigns him/her.
Bosse seems to have struggled with these issues, for in a later re-working 
of his method in the self-published volume Traité des pratiques géométrales et 
perspectives (Paris, 1665) he reconsidered this illustration by translating it into 
a three-dimensional object (fig. 4). As such, the demonstration of perspective 
shifts as it oversteps its previous, merely pictorial bounds and embraces the wider 
context of the book page itself. In this new pedagogical instrument (which recalls 
an earlier device Salomon de Caus designed in another context20), the reader is 
asked to lift a small tableau bearing a perspectival representation of a portion of 
the ground plan/book page onto which the picture itself has been glued, and to 
20. See Salomon de Caus, La perspective, avec la raison des ombres et miroirs, London 
and Frankfurt, Chez Jan Norton Imprimeur du roy de la Grande Bretaigne, aus langues 
estrangeres and Ches la vesue de Hulsius, 1612, n.p. (see the plate opposite Chap. 10). 
Daniele Barbaro had already made use of similar popup devices in the manuscript of 
La pratica della perspettiva that is now housed at the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana in 
 Venice, MS. IT. CL. IV. Cod. 40 (=5447).
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place it  vertically, that is, parallel to the cutout of the protagonist who is also to 
be set into vertical position.
Notwithstanding the originality of Bosse’s solution, this new device in 
fact reproduces the very same performance problems that plagued the original 
plate: whereas the small tableau is drawn according to the rules of one-point 
 perspective, its referent (i.e., the ground plan) is comprised of objects stemming 
from incompatible spaces. Although the tiled ground itself ought to be regarded 
as a mathematical plane or grid, the objects it “supports” (which in itself contra-
dicts the ideality of the grid)–i.e., the human figure seen in profile, the pyramid, 
and the rectangular parallelepiped–simply lack a shared spatial consistency. In 
addition, although the shadows projected from each object onto the ground 
plane seem to create the illusion of spatial unity, the human figure on the top-
left seems to lie flat on the ground, and the two solids are drawn by follow-
ing the rules of axonometry (as if axonometry were somehow more “natural” or 
more “primeval” than “artificial” perspective). Again, what is at stake here is the 
 violation of the perspectival system’s validity precisely when that validity is most 
crucial: at the moment in which the function of the spectator is demonstrated in 
relation to the space which he or she is to project.
What these examples seem to suggest is that the problem at hand ultimately 
concerns the perspectival system’s pragmatic unconscious. One could say that 
Fig. 4 : Abraham Bosse, Traité des pratiques géométrales et perspectives enseignées dans l’Academie royale de 
la peinture et sculpture, Paris, Chez l’auteur, 1665 (plate 50). Collection Centre Canadien d’Architecture/
Canadian Centre for Architecture, Montréal. Photograph by Eduardo Ralickas.
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it is a matter of figuring the real user’s “representative” in the picture plane in 
such a way as to have the latter’s gestures relate coherently to the former’s own 
gestures, which are bound to the requirements of the image’s meta-discourse 
itself. If the draughtsman (in the broadest sense of the term) is the “origin” of 
perspective, it follows that the figure of the draughtsman is the locus of perspec-
tive’s chief performative inconsistency. Interestingly enough, in the history of 
the perspective treatise there are a number of images in which the draughtsman 
takes centre stage.
Such is the case with one of the earliest illustrated perspective treatises 
(which is sometimes regarded as the most “naïve,” and for that reason most 
simple treatise of all): the anonymous Eyn schön nützlich Büchlin und Under-
weisung der Kunst des Messens.21 In this woodcut (fig. 5) one sees a seated 
21. Eyn schön nützlich Büchlin und Underweisung der Kunst des Messens, mit dem 
Zirckel, Richtscheidt oder Linial. Zu nutz allen kunstliebhabern, fürnemlich den Malern, 
Bildhawern, Goldschmiden, Seidenstickern, Steynmetzen, Schreinern auch allen andern, so 
sich der kunst des Messens (Perspectiva zu latin gnant) zugebrauchen lust haben, Simmern, 
Hieronymus Rodler, 1531. This book has been variously attributed to its printer, Rodler, and 
to its alleged sponsor, Johann II, Pfalzgraf und Herzog von der Pfalz Simmern- Sponheim.
Fig. 5 : Johann II, Pfalzgraf und Herzog von der Pfalz Simmern-Sponheim and Hieronymus Rodler, Eyn 
schön nützlich Büchlin und Underweisung der Kunst des Messens, Simmern, Rodler, 1531, n.p. (signature 
H2-v). Collection Centre Canadien d’Architecture/Canadian Centre for Architecture,  Montréal. Photo-
graph by Eduardo Ralickas.
177
reflections  on the pragmatics  of  the illustrated perspective  treatise
draughtsman at work in the middle of a small room. Given the woodcut’s 
 pedagogical  function, this draughtsman sits in for the book’s actual reader.22 His 
desk is theatrically positioned below a large window, and he busies himself with 
the task of copying the landscape that it frames. The window panes comprise a 
grid-like structure which the draughtsman has reproduced on the broad sheet 
that lies before him. Although this image is clearly not devised as a demonstra-
tion of perspective (instead, it rhetorically illustrates the method of squaring 
up a given drawing, or here a scene that is “squared down,” so to speak23), the 
woodcut as such, the site of this demonstration’s conditions of enunciation, is 
itself structured as a homogeneous perspectival space.24 As a result, reading this 
image is of necessity a performance undertaken under the aegis of its perspec-
tival framework.
As one begins to compare the draughtsman’s drawing with the veduta that 
the window frames, one begins to realize that both images are quite similar 
(particularly when viewing details such as the clouds). It is imperative to note, 
however, that these two landscape representations should be radically different. 
Given that perspective necessarily positions its static viewers at precise locations 
derivable from each of the system’s interconnected variables, it is a sheer impos-
sibility that the beholder’s and draughtsman’s respective points of view be iden-
tical. In this light, what the beholder perceives through the window should in no 
way correspond to the draughtsman’s visual possibilities with respect to the same 
scene. After having taken note of this incongruity, two interpretive possibilities 
remain open: either the draughtsman draws what the beholder sees through the 
22. The figure of the draughtsman one encounters in many perspective treatises is 
no doubt linked to the figure of the admonisher advocated by Alberti in De  Pictura. The 
difference between both figures may well lie in their respective rhetorical functions: 
whereas the Albertian admonisher tends to emphasize the affective nature of  beholding, 
the draughtsman’s function is of an “epistemological” nature. For an analysis of Alberti’s 
admonisher, see Alain Laframboise, Istoria et théorie de l’art. Italie, 15e, 16e siècles,  Montréal, 
Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1989, p. 47 et sq.
23. This technique notwithstanding, the rhetorical function of the “open window” 
sets the stage for a perspectival reading of this image.
24. Here, perspective is the condition of possibility of the woodcut’s figurative dis-
course as such. For an analysis of perspective as a mode of enunciation in the early Renais-
sance (particularly in the work of Paolo Uccello), see Louis Marin, Opacité de la peinture, 
nouvelle édition revue par Cléo Pace, Paris, Éditions de l’École des hautes études en 
sciences sociales, 2006, p. 95 et sq. 
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window25 (thus, his drawing is a fiction of a fiction so to speak) or, conversely, 
what the beholder is given to see through the window is none other than the 
draughtsman’s own vantage point onto the landscape, which the latter truthfully 
draws. For the purposes of the present argument though, the difference between 
these two interpretations is irrelevant, as they are symmetrically inverted versions 
of one another when considered from a pragmatic point of view. In both cases, 
the cognitive choices afforded to this image’s real user exceed the draughtsman’s 
visual possibilities, for the draughtsman is unable to compare both landscapes 
and thus reflect on their differing conditions of possibility (i.e., on the incompa-
tible vantage points from which they are viewed).26
In the final analysis, this illustration contradicts its own purpose, namely, 
that of teaching the beholder how to subject himself or herself to the sole valid 
point of view: that of the draughtsman. Clearly, the pedagogical narrative this 
illustration projects is inconsistent with the figurative means such a narrative 
deploys to entice the beholder to enter into this space of visual rationality. In Eyn 
schön nützlich Büchlin the two functions that were at play in the illustration of 
Vignola’s prima regola (i.e., “systemic closure” and the “delegation of looking”) 
enter into an open conflict: if perspective is a looking at looking, in the present 
case the image of the draughtsman, to whom the beholder delegates his or her 
looking, is incapable of effecting epistemic closure, for the book’s real user per-
forms beyond the limits ascribed by the image. In this sense, the act of delegation 
begins to appear as an act of self-alienation.
From this sampling of the visual record one can formulate the following 
hypothesis: perhaps what perspective treatises attempt, but are simply unable 
to accomplish, given the inherent limitations of the system, is to depict the 
viewer engaged in his or her act of viewing. The images that have been analyzed 
here indicate that as soon as one inserts the figure of the draughtsman–in its 
 various guises, be they implicit (Vignola, Bosse) or explicit (Eyn schön nützlich 
Büchlin)–within the framework of perspective demonstrations as a stand-in for 
25. This interpretation has been espoused by Lawrence Wright in Perspective in Per-
spective, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, p. 314, as well as by Andersen, 2007, p. 220.
26. My use of the term “reflection” is informed by Sartre’s terminology in  L’imaginaire: 
“Pour déterminer les caractères propres de l’image comme image, il faut recourir à un 
nouvel acte de conscience: il faut réfléchir. Ainsi l’image comme image n’est descriptible 
que par un acte du second degré pour lequel le regard se détourne de l’objet pour se 
diriger sur la façon dont cet objet est donné.” Jean-Paul Sartre, L’imaginaire. Psychologie 
phénoménologique de l’imagination [1940], édition revue et présentée par Arlette Elkaïm-
Sartre, Paris, Gallimard, coll. “Folio. Essais”, 2005, p. 15.
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the beholder’s looking, one is somehow attempting to figure the viewer/user of 
perspective. Yet this leads to pragmatic inconsistencies that come to the fore as 
the user performs the gestures that are scripted by the illustrations themselves. 
Ultimately, these pedagogic diagrams fail to account pictorially for the very acts 
they have their viewers accomplish in order to enter the system being described.
The narratological concept of metalepsis is useful to further understand the 
scope of the problem at hand.27 Metalepsis is a textual strategy in which the 
border between two narrative levels becomes uncertain as one or more  stories 
proliferate within a given narrative stream. Metalepsis may function in various 
ways: for instance, there are cases in which a story’s narrator suddenly takes 
part in the story he or she recounts. In other instances, the author of a given 
story includes himself or herself in the narrative frame by interacting with the 
 characters he or she originally created.28 According to Marie-Laure Ryan both 
these types of metalepsis may be termed “rhetorical.” She writes: “Rhetorical 
metalepsis opens a small window that allows a quick glance across [narrative] 
levels, but the window closes after a few sentences, and the operation ends up 
reasserting the existence of boundaries.”29 But what would happen if the window 
remained open, one wonders?
There is another type of metalepsis, which, unlike the rhetorical sort, 
threatens the coherence of the narrative frame itself. Ryan calls this ontological 
metalepsis. It arises in cases in which a voice stemming from a heterogeneous 
discursive field intervenes in a subordinate narrative space in such a way as to 
subvert the original narrative frame as such:
[in] a narrative work, ontological levels will become entangled when an existent 
 belongs to two or more levels at the same time, or when an existent migrates from 
one level to the next, causing two separate environments to blend.30
For perspective treatises to be epistemically consistent, they would have to 
make use of a kind of ontological metalepsis in which the actual viewer of a given 
perspective demonstration would be included in the image he or she sees. As 
27. For a sampling of recent research on metalepsis, see John Pier and Jean-Marie 
Schaeffer (eds.), Métalepses. Entorses au pacte de la représentation, Paris, Presses de 
l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2005.
28. See Gérard Genette, Figures III, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, coll. “Poétique”, 1972, 
p. 243-246. Also see Gérard Genette, Métalepse. De la figure à la fiction, Paris, Éditions du 
Seuil, coll. “Poétique”, 2004.
29. Marie-Laure Ryan, “Metaleptic Machines,” Semiotica 150, 2004, p. 441.
30. Ibid., p. 442.
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a result, the difference between representation, and the manipulation thereof, 
would collapse. One could call this hypothetical strategy a “visual metalepsis of 
the pragmatic user.” However, the images at hand all fail to perform such a feat. 
What the reader of these treatises is given time and again is, at best, a visual form 
of narrator-based metalepsis. Thus, in the examples above, the putative  narrator 
(read: draughtsman) of perspective appears within the frame of representation 
that he or she authors. The fact remains though: this narrator/draughtsman is 
incapable of accounting for the gestures performed by the image’s real user, 
even though the former allegedly “represents” the latter. Broadly speaking, these 
images are symptomatic of a fundamental characteristic of perspective treatises, 
namely, their failure to function as a site that fosters intersubjectivity, for these 
illustrations are unidirectional messages whose very power is predicated on the 
subjection of the user (i.e., on the “delegation of looking,” which goes hand in 
hand with the function of “epistemic closure”).
In linguistic terms one could translate this state of affairs as follows: by 
virtue of these treatises’ putative claim to an intersubjective sharing of know-
ledge (i.e., the subject who uses perspective is the “origin of perspective,” to use 
Damisch’s keen phrase), the draughtsman ought to encompass all users–he ought 
to be the sujet de l’énonciation of perspective itself. But in the cases that have 
Fig. 6 : Jacopo Barozzi da Vignola and Egnatio Danti, Le due regole della prospettiva pratica di M. Iacomo 
Barozzi da Vignola con i comentarij del R.P.M. Egnatio Danti dell ordine de predicatori matematico dello 
studio di Bologna, Rome, Francesco Zannetti, 1583, p. 105. Collection Centre Canadien d’Architecture/
Canadian Centre for Architecture, Montréal. Photograph by Eduardo Ralickas.
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been analyzed here, the draughtsman functions merely as the sujet de l’énoncé 
and the image as such can be likened to a mysterious voice that speaks from 
nowhere.
One of Vignola’s illustrations, also from Le due regole, emphatically drives 
this point home (fig. 6). In this striking, self-referential image Vignola spatializes 
this paper’s opening diagram (fig. 1). As a result, Vignola’s prima regola now func-
tions as a three-dimensional model drawn in correct perspective. The figure’s 
protagonist, now male, faces the parete (which, as an image, forfeits its previous 
mathematical significance). The large picture plane upon which he gazes is in 
perspective, both for him as for the reader of Le due regole. As in the earlier plate 
the human figure on the left stands in for the reader’s act of looking. Vignola has 
taken great care in representing the lines that determine the protagonist’s angle 
of vision. These lines allow him to see the entire span of the vertical picture 
plane that stands erect before him. However, since Vignola’s illustration is now 
in  perspective, it has its own vanishing point and horizon line, which are indepen-
dent of the relations being demonstrated in the foreground. As one projects the 
image’s orthogonal lines to determine the location of the plate’s “ultimate” and 
“original” vanishing point, one discovers that it lies in the eye of a second pro-
tagonist who lurks in the background, near the top-left corner of the image. Who 
is he? The answer is as simple as it is paradoxical: he is also a representative 
of the image’s real spectator. It follows that Vignola has unwittingly placed the 
viewer in an ambiguous situation, for in attempting to represent the beholder’s 
act of looking within the frame of perspective, the author has literally split the 
beholder in two. Ostensibly, what the “ultimate” beholder, on the top left, “sees” 
(given his own angle of vision, which coincides with the picture’s orthogonals) is 
himself–but from behind. 
Based on this reading of the pragmatic dynamics of the perspective treatise, 
one could argue that the artistic project of early German romanticism consisted 
not only in disclosing the pragmatic shortcomings of the classical age’s regime of 
representation,31 but also in devising a new pictorial paradigm whereby images 
were to fully address their beholders qua pragmatic users as artists espoused a 
new role in the shaping of political consciousness. With romanticism, the mode 
of address of images becomes a more sophisticated affair as the “failures” of 
the classical age are progressively internalized. In keeping with the romantics’ 
31. Fichte is now regarded as having effected such a (pragmatically based) critique 
of the classical paradigm. See Thomas-Fogiel, 1999. The romantics, I contend, followed 
suit by displacing Fichte’s discourse into the fields of art and aesthetics.
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enthusiastic conflation of “republicanism” and “transcendental philosophy,” one 
could term their programme an “image-based performance of republicanism.”32
During his tenure at the University of Jena between 1794 and 1799, Fichte 
developed a philosophical programme which is now regarded as an original and 
powerful critique of the classical age’s representational paradigm. Importantly, 
Fichte’s critique operates by addressing what I have termed here the classical age’s 
pragmatic unconscious. Fichte contends, for instance, that discourse on represen-
tation stemming from the early modern period systematically fails to account for 
the illocutionary acts of those who utter such discourse. These innovative ideas 
were first published in the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, the book 
upon which the romantic “revolution” was modelled.33 This text was immediately 
hailed, moreover, as a contribution, in the field of philosophy, comparable in 
merit, rigour, and method to the geometric work of Euclid.34 
There is a programmatic fragment written by Friedrich Schlegel for the 
Athenaeum that can now be understood in a new light. Indeed, in fragment 
n° 238 Schlegel contends that the romantic project (here designated by means 
of the open-ended term Poesie) is, in the wake of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre 
or “ philosophy of philosophy,” a “poetry of poetry.” Schlegel’s “transcendental 
poetry” is no mere art of reflexivity though, whereby artistic forms refer to them-
selves in what is no doubt one of modernity’s chief tropes, as many scholars have 
argued. In fact, Schlegel’s programmatic concept is to be read in terms of a new 
kind of self-reference, espoused by the German romantics, which the fore going 
critique of one of the classical age’s pedagogical paradigms has made clear, 
32. In this respect, the romantic paradigm subscribed to what Éric Michaud has aptly 
termed “salvation by means of images” in La fin du salut par l’image, Nîmes,  Jacqueline 
Chambon, 1993. In what follows, I can only sketch a set of arguments that I develop at 
length in my doctoral dissertation (in progress) which is provisionally entitled La nais-
sance de l’art performatif. Image, action et subjectivité dans le romantisme allemand.
33. This critique of representation is undertaken in §4, “Grundlage des theore tischen 
Wissens.” See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre als 
Handschrift für seine Zuhörer (1794), Einleitung und Register von Wilhelm G. Jacobs, 
Vierte Auflage, Hamburg, Meiner, Philosophische Bibliothek Band 246, 1997, p. 44-164. 
For an English translation, see Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Science of Knowledge, with the 
First and Second Introductions, ed. and trans. by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 120-217.
34. Fichte himself may have authored this comparison, which was published in 
Jena’s Intelligenzblatt der Allgemeinen Literatur-Zeitung, n° 113, October 1, 1794, p. 899. 
See Xavier Léon, Fichte et son temps, vol. 1, Paris, Armand Colin, 1922-1927, p. 378, 
note 1.
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namely, self-reference as performativity. Indeed, Schlegel defines Transzenden-
talpoesie as a process that “represents the producer along with the product.”35 In 
other words, self-reference is here conceived in terms of a generative performance 
with the user in which representational content fully acknowledges its producers 
and consumers as the “origin” of the system in which they take part.
It lies beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss the ways in which 
Schlegel himself enacts this performative paradigm within fragment n° 238, 
which is both a model and a performance of Transzendentalpoesie itself, or to 
address the contradictions that arise. Suffice to say that Fichte’s insights, as well 
as Schlegel’s aesthetic appropriation thereof, reached the Dresden-based painter 
Caspar David Friedrich, who was an industrious reader of perspective treatises.36 
His art is, to some extent, a mimetic extension of Transzendentalpoesie, now 
couched in pictorial terms. As such, it seeks to perform “republican” space with 
and for the attentive viewer. Given Friedrich’s involvement with perspective trea-
tises, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his politics compelled him 
to reconsider pictorial space as a vector of social change. 
35. The original terms are “das Produzierende” and “das Produkt.” See Friedrich 
Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol. 2, hrsg. von Ernst Behler unter 
 Mitwirkung von Jean-Jacques Anstett und Hans Eichner, Padeborn, Munich and Vienna, 
Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, p. 204.
36. This fact has largely escaped art-historical attention. It remains to be demonstra-
ted that Friedrich’s pictorial devices, such as the Rückenfigur, are partly motivated by 
a reflection on the pragmatic issues I have addressed here. In particular, Friedrich’s 
work instrumentalizes Johann Henrich Lambert’s J.H. Lamberts freye Perspective, oder 
 Anweisung, jeden perspektivischen Aufriß von freyen Stücken und ohne Grundriß zu 
 verfertigen, zweyte Auflage, mit Anmerkungen und Zusätzen vermehrt, Zürich, bey Orell, 
Geßner, Fueßlin und Compagnie, 1774. The second (expanded) edition of the Freye 
 Perspective is of capital importance for Friedrich studies. Not only does Lambert append 
what is one of the first German-language histories of perspective (all the examples I have 
analyzed here are  mentioned in the 1774 edition), but more interestingly, Friedrich made 
explicit use of Lambert’s treatise when conceiving his 1805-1806 sepia diptych View from 
the Artist’s  Studio, Left Window, Right Window (Vienna, Österreichische Galerie im 
 Belvedere; Inv.-Nr. 1850, 1849)–a work that epitomizes the painter’s attempt to address 
the viewer as both producer and witness of a new, intersubjective form of space. Structu-
rally speaking, this work is the genesis of the larger Rückenfigur canvases. Arguably, the 
development of Friedrich’s pictorial devices dialogues with Lambert’s treatise in funda-
mental ways, as the artist quotes Lambert’s image of two mirrors with differing angles of 
incidence (Lambert’s fig. 56), as well as his motif of a room with two rear windows and 
a continuous horizon line. This motif is in fact one of Lambert’s prime examples for the 
teaching of perspectival space (see Lambert’s image: Tab. III, fig. XIII).
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Friedrich, Fichte, and the Jena romantics were highly critical of the  structure 
of French art. From the romantic vantage point, although the French had 
instigated a social and political revolution unlike any before it, the framework 
of French art remained well within the conservative paradigm of the Ancien 
Régime. In this light, Friedrich’s “republicanism” underpins his critique of the 
perspectival paradigm–that is, his critique of the classical age’s unacknowledged 
beholder. As of 1806, the year in which he completed the diptych View from the 
Artist’s Studio, Left Window, Right Window, Friedrich’s concerns turned to the 
problem of intersubjective space. Although art historians have simply failed to 
notice the extent to wich Friedrich’s art constantly dialogues with the perspec-
tive treatise, all the major elements of the 1806 diptych, which lays the ground 
for Friedrich’s later Rückenfiguren canvases, stem from illustrations contained in 
identifiable and widely circulated treatises.
The classical age’s pragmatic unconscious is arguably the ground upon 
which Friedrich’s pictorial dispositifs develop. In this light, Friedrich’s paintings 
can be regarded as performative instruments that are about the (political) agency 
of the beholders who use them. Such paintings, moreover, were conceived preci-
sely in highly heated political moments, such as the retour à l’ordre following 
the Wars of Liberation. His famed Rückenfigur entitled Wanderer Above a Sea 
of Fog (circa 1818; Hamburg, Kunsthalle) is a case in point.37 In all probability 
it depicts a fallen hero of the wars of Liberation (and as such, it was devised as 
 a  commemorative “portrait”). Importantly though, the function of this image, 
as history painting, is to enact history with and for the attentive viewer.38 For 
 Friedrich, it is a discourse on political freedom couched in what was regarded 
as the visual language of that very freedom. Pictorial space and the constitution 
37. The Rückenfigur was not developed as a rhetorical device as some art historians 
would have it, but as a pragmatic dispositif that addresses the types of problems I have been 
exploring in the context of the perspective treatise.
38. My approach differs from leading Friedrich scholar Joseph Leo Koerner’s in 
many respects. Whereas Koerner tends to emphasize the irretrievably lost sense of time 
 Friedrich’s works foster (and thus the historical gap between artist and viewer), I  contend 
that as history painting, Friedrich’s paintings are indexes of their present beholders (they 
are not site-specific but “time-specific”). By providing an alternative genealogy (Fichte/
Schlegel/Hardenberg/Friedrich), my approach addresses the pragmatic dynamics of 
romanticism as such. As a result, in Friedrich’s hands history painting becomes a “pra-
gmatic history” of present viewer, to use an expression coined by Fichte, who regarded 
his own philosophical work as “eine pragmatische Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes.” 
(Fichte, 1997, p. 141).
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of a “ republi can” community go hand in hand in this process of social trans-
formation by means of painted images. Future research may well show that as 
self-referential, performative devices, such romantic works are constructed on 
the very site of the failure of perspective: the place in which saying and doing 
are part and parcel of the same operation. To modern ears such a turn of phrase 
may sound overly Austinian. In actual fact, it is highly “romantic” as it is a quote 
from Friedrich von Hardenberg (“Novalis”), who incidentally coined a term to 
designate that “operation”: romantisieren.39
39. Quoted in Jean-Marie Schaeffer, La naissance de la littérature. La théorie esthé-
tique du romantisme allemand, Paris, Presses de l’École normale supérieure, coll. “Arts et 
langage”, 1983, p. 21. 
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